Iran's Nuclear Program

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iran's leaders have worked to pursue nuclear energy technology since the 1950s, spurred by the launch of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. It made steady progress, with Western help, through the early 1970s. But concern over Iranian intentions followed by the upheaval of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 effectively ended outside assistance. Iran was known to be reviving its civilian nuclear programs during the 1990s, but revelations in 2002 and 2003 of clandestine research into fuel enrichment and conversion raised international concern that Iran's ambitions had metastasized beyond peaceful intent. Iran has consistently denied allegations it seeks to develop a bomb. Yet many in the international community remain skeptical. Despite a U.S. intelligence finding in November 2007 that concluded Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Bush administration warned that Iran sought to weaponize its nuclear program, concerns the Obama administration shares. Nonproliferation experts note Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium continues to progress but disagree on how close Iran is to mastering capabilities to weaponize. But the September 2009 revelation of a second uranium enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom--constructed under the radar of international inspectors--deepened suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Atoms from America
Iran's efforts to develop nuclear energy trace to 1957, in connection with a push from the Eisenhower administration to increase its military, economic, and civilian assistance to Iran. On March 5 of that year, the two countries announced a "proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy" under the auspices of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. The deal was intended to open doors for U.S. investment in Iran's civilian nuclear industries, such as health care and medicine. The plan also called for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to lease Iran up to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for research purposes. Two years after the agreement was made public, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ordered the establishment of an institute at Tehran University--the Tehran Nuclear Research Center--and negotiated with the United States to supply a five-megawatt reactor. Over the next decade the United States provided nuclear fuel and equipment that Iran used to start up its research. Gary Samore, President Obama's top expert on weapons of mass destruction, told CFR.org in 2008 that the cooperation was meant to assist Iran in developing nuclear energy while steering Tehran away from indigenous fuel-cycle research. On July 1, 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the day it opened for signature. Six years later Iran completed its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
By the 1970s, France and Germany joined the United States in providing assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. Regional wars and predictions of a looming energy shortfall prompted the shah to explore alternative forms of power production. In March 1974, he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and announced plans to "get, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts [of electricity] from nuclear power stations." By the mid-1970s, Iran had signed contracts with Western firms--including France's Framatome and Germany's Kraftwerk Union--for the construction of nuclear plants and supply of nuclear fuel.
Second Thoughts on a Nuclear Iran
Despite the early and sustained flow of nuclear technology to Tehran, Western governmental support for Iran's nuclear program began to erode ahead of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In August 1974, a U.S. special national intelligence estimate (PDF) declared that while "Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are entirely in the planning stage," the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May 1974.
"If Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other [partner] countries." - P.J. Crowley, U.S. State Department spokesman
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors atDarkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects. After the Islamic Revolution, the seizure of U.S. hostages, and termination of diplomatic relations in 1979, U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear efforts increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Washington blocked nuclear deals between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in Columbia University's Journal of International Affairs in 2007 that Washington's shift away from supporting Iran's nuclear energy program left Tehran with little choice but to be discreet in its nuclear activities (PDF). "To avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments," Zarif writes, "Iran refrained for disclosing the details of its programs."
Known Capabilities
The withdrawal of Western support after the Islamic Revolution slowed Iran's nuclear progress. And a confluence of factors--opposition to nuclear technology by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exodus of nuclear scientists, and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facility by Israel in 1981, which removed an immediate threat--sent Iran's nuclear program into a tailspin. But many nonproliferation experts believe Iran became interested again in a nuclear program by the mid-1980s. Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, writes there is evidence Iran received assistance from Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khanas early as 1985, though it wasn't until the death of Khomeini in 1989 that Tehran's efforts reached critical mass. [Khan, speaking to a Pakistani television journalist in August 2009, confirmed that his network assisted Iran (PDF) in contacting suppliers of nuclear technology].
Unlike his predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei held a more favorable view of nuclear energy and military technology, and set out to rebuild Tehran's program. Analysts also believe the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as a growing U.S. presence in the region, pushed Tehran to ramp up its research. In a boost to the civilian nuclear effort, Russia in January 1995 picked up where Germany left off, signing a contract with Iran to complete two 950-megawatt light-water reactors at Bushehr (with fuel supplied by Russia). In September 2008, the Russian company building the power plantreiterated its commitment (AFP) to finishing the project, while Moscow has said it hopes to fire up the reactor by the end of 2009 (Press TV). Iranian officials have also announced that the Darkhovin project has resumed, and plans call for a 360-megawatt reactor to be operational there by 2016. Iran--which has also turned to China, Pakistan, and North Korea for nuclear technology and assistance--claims it wants to build nuclear power plants to diversify its energy portfolio.

With an eye toward fueling these facilities with domestically produced fuel--and, many experts say, to develop a weapon--Iran has built a vast network (PDF) of uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, and research reactors. Of these facilities, about a dozen are considered major nuclear sites (PDF). For instance, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center employs as many as three thousand scientists and is suspected of housing Iran's weapons program, according to the U.S.-funded nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. Isfahan is also the location of Iran's uranium-conversion efforts, where approximately 366 tons of uranium hexafluoride has been produced since March 2004. This so-called feedstock is fed into centrifuges at another central site: the Natanz enrichment facility.
At Natanz, first-generation centrifuges (IR-1) purchased from Pakistan spin uranium hexafluoride at great speeds to increase the percentage of uranium-235, the principle ingredient for both power production and weapons capability. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent of the uranium-235 isotope, and generally, light-water power reactors require enrichment levels of 3 percent to 5 percent (levels of low-enriched uranium, or LEU). Weapons-grade uranium--also known as highly-enriched uranium, or HEU--is around 90 percent (technically, HEU is any concentration over 20 percent, but weapons-grade levels are described as being in excess of 90 percent). According to the IAEA, Iran is capable of enriching to about 4.7 percent. David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates Iran is producing roughly 2.77 kg of LEU per day (PDF), a rate that has remained consistent throughout 2009. Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says if Iran were to stockpile sufficient LEU they would be able to produce 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium for production of a single bomb "within a couple of months," a timeline Albright agreed with during a February 2009 interview with CFR.org. Iran is using centrifuges to enrich uranium hexafluoride gas, increasing the concentration of uranium-235. Senior American officials, speaking on background, told reporters in September 2009 that a second enrichment facility under construction near Qom could holdabout 3,000 centrifuge machines. "Now, that's not a large enough number to make any sense from a commercial standpoint," the official said. "But if you want to use the facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size."
Unanswered Questions
International skepticism of Iranian intentions was first aroused in August 2002 when a London-based Iranian opposition group disclosed details about a secret heavy-water production plant at Arak, as well as the underground enrichment facility at Natanz. In May 2003, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the disclosure of Arak and Natanz raised serious questions about Iran's nuclear intentions. "We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons," Boucher said, "using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant)." These revelations, coupled with subsequent admissions from Iran that it has concealed aspects of its program, prompted the IAEA to intensify inspections.
"Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program." -- IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
While international inspectors have never found concrete evidence linking Iran's nuclear program to weapons development, Iran's concealment of its program--like the partially constructed enrichment facility near Qom, which Western officials say was under construction for years before Iran's disclosure in the fall of 2009--has fed concerns. In a June 2003 report (PDF), IAEA inspectors concluded that Iran had failed to meet obligations under its Safeguards Agreement signed in 1974. Failures included withholding construction and design details of new facilities, and not reporting processed and imported uranium. Some undeclared shipments dated to 1991, the IAEA said. International pressure following the revelations led Iran to temporarily cease its enrichment-related activities, and in late 2003 Tehran signed an Additional Protocol allowing the atomic agency greater access to nuclear sites. Negotiations with members of the European Union quickly followed (PDF). But on August 8, 2005, Iran announced it was resuming uranium conversion at Isfahan. By early 2006, IAEA inspectors confirmed that Iran had once again resumed its enrichment program. Today Iran operates thousands of IR-1 centrifuges-the majority at Natanz-though the total number of operational devices is unclear. [AnAugust 2009 IAEA report found that 8,308 centrifuges were either enriching uranium or installed at the facility]. Construction of a commercial-scale facility at Natanz, which will house over fifty thousand centrifuges, is also under way.
Under the terms of the NPT, signatories have the "inalienable right" to produce fuel for civilian energy production, either by enriching uranium or separating plutonium. But the United States and other Western governments accuse Iran of failing to abide by NPT safeguards, and of pursuing technology to produce nuclear weapons. Paul K. Kerr of the Congressional Research Service wrote in a August 2009 report (PDF) that the principle proliferation concern is "Tehran's construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility " at Natanz. Experts say enrichment of uranium hexafluoride gas is of particular concern, because producing weapons-grade fuel (HEU) is considered the most difficult aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Kerr also counts Iran's construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak--which contains plutonium in its spent fuel--as another proliferation concern.
Albright, of ISIS, says Iranian enrichment capabilities are improving, a troubling development given Iran's continued refusal to answer IAEA questions about past activities. In February 2008, the IAEA presented Iran with intelligence collected by the United States that U.S. officials say proves Tehran worked to develop nuclear weapons in the recent past. The intelligence is believed to have been smuggled out of Iran on a laptop computer in 2004 and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The data included (PDF) alleged evidence of the so-called Green Salt project, a secret uranium-processing program; high-explosives testing; and design of a reentry vehicle "which could have a military nuclear dimension," the IAEA says. Iranian officials claim the data is fake. But the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that while Iran likely halted its weapons program in fall 2003, "Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" in the future. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, speaking in September 2009, said Iran continues to be uncooperative on many fronts, making it impossible to determine Tehran's intent. "Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues," he said, "which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program."
Sanctions and Saber Rattling
The United States has imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Iran for nearly three decades (Arms Control Today), but international efforts to cripple Iran's nuclear program have coalesced more recently. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed an "absence of confidence (PDF) that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes." Five months later, the board voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, and in December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted the first of a series of resolutions imposing sanctions to punish Iran for continued uranium enrichment. Resolution 1737 initiated a block on the sale or transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. Subsequent resolutions--the most recent in September 2008, which reaffirmed past mandates--added financial and travel sanctions on Iranian individuals and companies. In June 2008, the European Union imposed its own set of sanctions, freezing the assets of nearly forty individuals and entities doing business with Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank. Western officials have accused Bank Melli of supporting Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
Now some members of Congress are backing a bill that would authorize the White House to penalize foreign companies for selling refined petroleum to Iran. Some analysts support this approach, but former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton suggests only the threat of force (WSJ) can prevent an Iran nuclear bomb. CFR's Micah Zenko says Israel may be prepared to act (LAT) in that regard if the United States doesn't.
Despite increasing calls for a military solution, international diplomacy continues apace. In mid-2008, the European Union resubmitted a 2006 offer of incentives for Iran to give up its enrichment activities. The Iranian response to the proposal has been mixed, and the EU's chief nuclear negotiator, Javier Solana, has expressed pessimism that the efforts will succeed. Russia and China, meanwhile, have resisted calls for a fourth round of UN sanctions. But U.S. officials remain committed to a bilateral dual-track approach: international sanctions on one hand, and incentives on the other. Talks between Iran, the U.S., and other world powers are scheduled for October 1, 2009. "If Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other [partner] countries," Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley told reporters on September 11, 2009. He added: if "Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that."

Iran's Nuclear Program

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iran's leaders have worked to pursue nuclear energy technology since the 1950s, spurred by the launch of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. It made steady progress, with Western help, through the early 1970s. But concern over Iranian intentions followed by the upheaval of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 effectively ended outside assistance. Iran was known to be reviving its civilian nuclear programs during the 1990s, but revelations in 2002 and 2003 of clandestine research into fuel enrichment and conversion raised international concern that Iran's ambitions had metastasized beyond peaceful intent. Iran has consistently denied allegations it seeks to develop a bomb. Yet many in the international community remain skeptical. Despite a U.S. intelligence finding in November 2007 that concluded Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Bush administration warned that Iran sought to weaponize its nuclear program, concerns the Obama administration shares. Nonproliferation experts note Iran's ability to produce enriched uranium continues to progress but disagree on how close Iran is to mastering capabilities to weaponize. But the September 2009 revelation of a second uranium enrichment facility near the holy city of Qom--constructed under the radar of international inspectors--deepened suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Atoms from America
Iran's efforts to develop nuclear energy trace to 1957, in connection with a push from the Eisenhower administration to increase its military, economic, and civilian assistance to Iran. On March 5 of that year, the two countries announced a "proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy" under the auspices of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. The deal was intended to open doors for U.S. investment in Iran's civilian nuclear industries, such as health care and medicine. The plan also called for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to lease Iran up to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for research purposes. Two years after the agreement was made public, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ordered the establishment of an institute at Tehran University--the Tehran Nuclear Research Center--and negotiated with the United States to supply a five-megawatt reactor. Over the next decade the United States provided nuclear fuel and equipment that Iran used to start up its research. Gary Samore, President Obama's top expert on weapons of mass destruction, told CFR.org in 2008 that the cooperation was meant to assist Iran in developing nuclear energy while steering Tehran away from indigenous fuel-cycle research. On July 1, 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the day it opened for signature. Six years later Iran completed its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
By the 1970s, France and Germany joined the United States in providing assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. Regional wars and predictions of a looming energy shortfall prompted the shah to explore alternative forms of power production. In March 1974, he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and announced plans to "get, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts [of electricity] from nuclear power stations." By the mid-1970s, Iran had signed contracts with Western firms--including France's Framatome and Germany's Kraftwerk Union--for the construction of nuclear plants and supply of nuclear fuel.
Second Thoughts on a Nuclear Iran
Despite the early and sustained flow of nuclear technology to Tehran, Western governmental support for Iran's nuclear program began to erode ahead of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In August 1974, a U.S. special national intelligence estimate (PDF) declared that while "Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are entirely in the planning stage," the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May 1974.
"If Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other [partner] countries." - P.J. Crowley, U.S. State Department spokesman
This concern led Western governments to withdraw support for Iran's nuclear program. Pressure on France, which in 1973 signed a deal to build two reactors atDarkhovin, and Germany, whose Kraftwerk Union began building a pair of reactors at Bushehr in 1975, led to the cancellation of both projects. After the Islamic Revolution, the seizure of U.S. hostages, and termination of diplomatic relations in 1979, U.S. opposition to Iran's nuclear efforts increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Washington blocked nuclear deals between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in Columbia University's Journal of International Affairs in 2007 that Washington's shift away from supporting Iran's nuclear energy program left Tehran with little choice but to be discreet in its nuclear activities (PDF). "To avoid the [U.S.-led] restrictions and impediments," Zarif writes, "Iran refrained for disclosing the details of its programs."
Known Capabilities
The withdrawal of Western support after the Islamic Revolution slowed Iran's nuclear progress. And a confluence of factors--opposition to nuclear technology by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exodus of nuclear scientists, and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facility by Israel in 1981, which removed an immediate threat--sent Iran's nuclear program into a tailspin. But many nonproliferation experts believe Iran became interested again in a nuclear program by the mid-1980s. Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, writes there is evidence Iran received assistance from Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khanas early as 1985, though it wasn't until the death of Khomeini in 1989 that Tehran's efforts reached critical mass. [Khan, speaking to a Pakistani television journalist in August 2009, confirmed that his network assisted Iran (PDF) in contacting suppliers of nuclear technology].
Unlike his predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei held a more favorable view of nuclear energy and military technology, and set out to rebuild Tehran's program. Analysts also believe the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as a growing U.S. presence in the region, pushed Tehran to ramp up its research. In a boost to the civilian nuclear effort, Russia in January 1995 picked up where Germany left off, signing a contract with Iran to complete two 950-megawatt light-water reactors at Bushehr (with fuel supplied by Russia). In September 2008, the Russian company building the power plantreiterated its commitment (AFP) to finishing the project, while Moscow has said it hopes to fire up the reactor by the end of 2009 (Press TV). Iranian officials have also announced that the Darkhovin project has resumed, and plans call for a 360-megawatt reactor to be operational there by 2016. Iran--which has also turned to China, Pakistan, and North Korea for nuclear technology and assistance--claims it wants to build nuclear power plants to diversify its energy portfolio.

With an eye toward fueling these facilities with domestically produced fuel--and, many experts say, to develop a weapon--Iran has built a vast network (PDF) of uranium mines, enrichment plants, conversion sites, and research reactors. Of these facilities, about a dozen are considered major nuclear sites (PDF). For instance, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center employs as many as three thousand scientists and is suspected of housing Iran's weapons program, according to the U.S.-funded nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. Isfahan is also the location of Iran's uranium-conversion efforts, where approximately 366 tons of uranium hexafluoride has been produced since March 2004. This so-called feedstock is fed into centrifuges at another central site: the Natanz enrichment facility.
At Natanz, first-generation centrifuges (IR-1) purchased from Pakistan spin uranium hexafluoride at great speeds to increase the percentage of uranium-235, the principle ingredient for both power production and weapons capability. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent of the uranium-235 isotope, and generally, light-water power reactors require enrichment levels of 3 percent to 5 percent (levels of low-enriched uranium, or LEU). Weapons-grade uranium--also known as highly-enriched uranium, or HEU--is around 90 percent (technically, HEU is any concentration over 20 percent, but weapons-grade levels are described as being in excess of 90 percent). According to the IAEA, Iran is capable of enriching to about 4.7 percent. David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates Iran is producing roughly 2.77 kg of LEU per day (PDF), a rate that has remained consistent throughout 2009. Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says if Iran were to stockpile sufficient LEU they would be able to produce 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium for production of a single bomb "within a couple of months," a timeline Albright agreed with during a February 2009 interview with CFR.org. Iran is using centrifuges to enrich uranium hexafluoride gas, increasing the concentration of uranium-235. Senior American officials, speaking on background, told reporters in September 2009 that a second enrichment facility under construction near Qom could holdabout 3,000 centrifuge machines. "Now, that's not a large enough number to make any sense from a commercial standpoint," the official said. "But if you want to use the facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size."
Unanswered Questions
International skepticism of Iranian intentions was first aroused in August 2002 when a London-based Iranian opposition group disclosed details about a secret heavy-water production plant at Arak, as well as the underground enrichment facility at Natanz. In May 2003, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the disclosure of Arak and Natanz raised serious questions about Iran's nuclear intentions. "We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons," Boucher said, "using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant)." These revelations, coupled with subsequent admissions from Iran that it has concealed aspects of its program, prompted the IAEA to intensify inspections.
"Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program." -- IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
While international inspectors have never found concrete evidence linking Iran's nuclear program to weapons development, Iran's concealment of its program--like the partially constructed enrichment facility near Qom, which Western officials say was under construction for years before Iran's disclosure in the fall of 2009--has fed concerns. In a June 2003 report (PDF), IAEA inspectors concluded that Iran had failed to meet obligations under its Safeguards Agreement signed in 1974. Failures included withholding construction and design details of new facilities, and not reporting processed and imported uranium. Some undeclared shipments dated to 1991, the IAEA said. International pressure following the revelations led Iran to temporarily cease its enrichment-related activities, and in late 2003 Tehran signed an Additional Protocol allowing the atomic agency greater access to nuclear sites. Negotiations with members of the European Union quickly followed (PDF). But on August 8, 2005, Iran announced it was resuming uranium conversion at Isfahan. By early 2006, IAEA inspectors confirmed that Iran had once again resumed its enrichment program. Today Iran operates thousands of IR-1 centrifuges-the majority at Natanz-though the total number of operational devices is unclear. [AnAugust 2009 IAEA report found that 8,308 centrifuges were either enriching uranium or installed at the facility]. Construction of a commercial-scale facility at Natanz, which will house over fifty thousand centrifuges, is also under way.
Under the terms of the NPT, signatories have the "inalienable right" to produce fuel for civilian energy production, either by enriching uranium or separating plutonium. But the United States and other Western governments accuse Iran of failing to abide by NPT safeguards, and of pursuing technology to produce nuclear weapons. Paul K. Kerr of the Congressional Research Service wrote in a August 2009 report (PDF) that the principle proliferation concern is "Tehran's construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility " at Natanz. Experts say enrichment of uranium hexafluoride gas is of particular concern, because producing weapons-grade fuel (HEU) is considered the most difficult aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Kerr also counts Iran's construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak--which contains plutonium in its spent fuel--as another proliferation concern.
Albright, of ISIS, says Iranian enrichment capabilities are improving, a troubling development given Iran's continued refusal to answer IAEA questions about past activities. In February 2008, the IAEA presented Iran with intelligence collected by the United States that U.S. officials say proves Tehran worked to develop nuclear weapons in the recent past. The intelligence is believed to have been smuggled out of Iran on a laptop computer in 2004 and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The data included (PDF) alleged evidence of the so-called Green Salt project, a secret uranium-processing program; high-explosives testing; and design of a reentry vehicle "which could have a military nuclear dimension," the IAEA says. Iranian officials claim the data is fake. But the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that while Iran likely halted its weapons program in fall 2003, "Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" in the future. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, speaking in September 2009, said Iran continues to be uncooperative on many fronts, making it impossible to determine Tehran's intent. "Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues," he said, "which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear program."
Sanctions and Saber Rattling
The United States has imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Iran for nearly three decades (Arms Control Today), but international efforts to cripple Iran's nuclear program have coalesced more recently. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed an "absence of confidence (PDF) that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes." Five months later, the board voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, and in December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted the first of a series of resolutions imposing sanctions to punish Iran for continued uranium enrichment. Resolution 1737 initiated a block on the sale or transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. Subsequent resolutions--the most recent in September 2008, which reaffirmed past mandates--added financial and travel sanctions on Iranian individuals and companies. In June 2008, the European Union imposed its own set of sanctions, freezing the assets of nearly forty individuals and entities doing business with Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank. Western officials have accused Bank Melli of supporting Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
Now some members of Congress are backing a bill that would authorize the White House to penalize foreign companies for selling refined petroleum to Iran. Some analysts support this approach, but former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton suggests only the threat of force (WSJ) can prevent an Iran nuclear bomb. CFR's Micah Zenko says Israel may be prepared to act (LAT) in that regard if the United States doesn't.
Despite increasing calls for a military solution, international diplomacy continues apace. In mid-2008, the European Union resubmitted a 2006 offer of incentives for Iran to give up its enrichment activities. The Iranian response to the proposal has been mixed, and the EU's chief nuclear negotiator, Javier Solana, has expressed pessimism that the efforts will succeed. Russia and China, meanwhile, have resisted calls for a fourth round of UN sanctions. But U.S. officials remain committed to a bilateral dual-track approach: international sanctions on one hand, and incentives on the other. Talks between Iran, the U.S., and other world powers are scheduled for October 1, 2009. "If Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other [partner] countries," Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley told reporters on September 11, 2009. He added: if "Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that."

INDO-RUSSIA BILATERAL RELATION

During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union enjoyed a strong strategic, military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the collapse of the USSR, India improved its relations with the West but it continued its close relations with Russia. India is the second largest market for Russian arms industry.

Both countries signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971, in which the dominant aspect was the emphasis on security clauses. As a consequence, India benefited from the FSU’s support to its covert and later overt role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. On its part, India remained supportive of FSU’s policies throughout the Cold War era, especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
A major breakthrough was achieved when the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, paid an official visit to India in October 2000. Both countries signed a ‘Declaration on Strategic Partnership’, and ten agreements covering various aspects of bilateral relations. The Declaration spelt out in detail the long-term nature of Indo-Russian relations in all aspects of mutual cooperation, like political, defence, economic and trade, science and technological and cultural spheres. Also, the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the bilateral talks affirmed Indian and Russian positions on various bilateral, regional and international issues. The Putin visit was reciprocated by that of the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to Russia in November 2001. In the second visit of President Putin to India in December 2002, both countries signed a ‘Declaration on Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership’ between them. These visits have resulted in the signing of numerous agreements encompassing political, defense, economic, legal, and cultural aspects of their relations.

Defence relations between India and the Russian Federation have a historical perspective. Russia has been an important supplier of defense goods for several decades. Today, the cooperation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service to service contacts, including joint exercises. India is the second largest market for Russian arms industry.

India and Russia have several major joint military programs such as those mentioned below:
§ BrahMos cruise missile program
§ INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier program
§ 5th generation fighter jet program
§ Sukhoi Su-30MKI program (230+ to be built by Hindustan Aeronautics)
§ Ilyushin/HAL Tactical Transport Aircraft
Bilateral trade turnover is modest and stood at US $ 3 bn in 2006-07, out of which Indian Exports to Russia were valued at US $ 908 mn. Main Indian exports to Russia are pharmaceuticals; tea, coffee & spices; apparel & clothing; edible preparations; and engineering goods. Main Indian imports from Russia are iron and steel; fertilizers; non-ferrous metals; paper products; coal, coke & briquettes; cereals; and rubber. Indo-Russian trade is expected to reach US$10 billion by 2010.
Energy sector is an important area in Indo-Russian bilateral relations. In 2001, ONGC-Videsh Limited acquired 20% stake in the Sakhalin-I oil and gas project in the Russian Federation, and has invested about US $ 1.7 billion in the project. The Russian company Gazprom and Gas Authority of India Ltd. have collaborated in joint development of a block in the Bay of Bengal. Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project with two units of 1000 MW each is a good example of Indo-Russian nuclear energy cooperation. Both sides have expressed interest in expanding cooperation in the energy sector.
In December 2008, Russia and India signed an agreement to build civilian nuclear reactors in India during a visit by the Russian president to New Delhi
At present, Russia and India have a scientific and technological cooperation arrangement under the Integrated Long Term Programme of Cooperation in Science and Technology (till 2010)
In a nutshell, India and Russia are in the process of institutionalizing their relations. The formation of various working groups to monitor developments on political, economic, science and technology and cultural fronts will go a long way in strengthening their bilateral relations. Warmth in Indo-Russia relations depends to a greater degree on how India balances itself between its increasing desire to ally with the US, Israel and the West, and maintain traditional relations with the Russian Federation.

LOOK EAST POLICY

LOOK EAST POLICY

Look-east policy was launched in 1992 just after the end of the cold war, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the start of liberalization, it was a very strategic policy decision taken by the government in the foreign policy. The policy was given an initial thrust with the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visiting China, Japan, South Korea,Vietnam and Singapore and India becoming a important dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992. Since the beginning of this century, India has given a big push to this policy by becoming a summit level partner of ASEAN (2002) and getting involved in some regional initiatives such as the BIMSTEC and the Ganga Mekong Cooperation and becoming a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005.

It is only with the formulation of the Look-East policy in the last decade (1992), India had started giving this region due importance in the foreign policy. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, and a summit level partner (on par with China, Japan and Korea) in 2002.The first India-ASEAN Business Summit was held at New Delhi in October 2002.The first Indo ASEAN summit was held in 2002 at Phnom Penh (Cambodia).

Although it had traditionally supported Burma's pro-democracy movement for many years, India's policy changed in 1993, making friendly overtures to the military junta. India signed trade agreements and increased its investments in Burma; although private sector activity remains low, India's state corporations have landed lucrative contracts for industrial projects and the construction of major roads and highways, pipelines and upgrading of ports. India has also increased its competition with China over the harnessing of Burma's significant oil and natural gas reserves, seeking to establish a major and stable source of energy for its growing domestic needs, countering Chinese monopoly over Burmese resources and reducing dependence on oil-rich Middle Eastern nations. Although China remains Burma's largest military supplier, India has offered to train Burma's military personnel and has sought their cooperation in curbing separatist militants and the heavy drug trafficking affecting much of Northeast India.

India has also established strong commercial, cultural and military ties with the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia.^[2] India signed free trade agreements with Sri Lanka and Thailand and stepped up its military cooperation with them as well. It has forged numerous free trade agreements with East Asianeconomies, including a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with Singapore and an Early Harvest Scheme with Thailand, while it is negotiating agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Ties have been strengthened with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea over common emphasis on democracy, human rights and strategic interests. South Korea and Japan remain amongst the major sources of foreign investment in India.

While India has remained a staunch supporter of the "One China" policy and recognized the People's Republic of China on the mainland over the Republic of China authorities on Taiwan, it has, nevertheless, pursued a policy of increasing engagement with the island.India has stepped up engagement with East Asia fueled by its need for cooperation on counter-terrorism, humanitarian relief, anti-piracy, maritime and energy security, confidence-building and balancing the influence of other powers, notably China. Driven by the fact that more than 50% of India's trade passes through the Malacca Strait, the Indian navy has established a Far Eastern Naval Command off Port Blair on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India has also been conducting joint naval exercises with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993, with Vietnam in 2000 and has engaged in joint patrols with Indonesia in the Andaman Sea since 2002. Japan and India were also members of the tsunami relief regional core group in the Indian Ocean in 2004 along with Australia and the United States.

Advantages of the policy

* 1991 was a turning point in India's economic relations due to its new Look east policy. Before 1990 India's main focus was on the Soviet Union because of which ties with the other major Asian powers like China and Japan were not strong.India's inward-looking orientation disconnected it from the neighborhood to the East, kept it apart from the economic growth of East Asia. By the turn of the 1990s, India had totally marginalized itself. The first phase of the Look East policy launched by the Narasimha Rao Government in the early 1990s focused on renewing contact with a region that India had drifted away from.

* The Look-East policy has been given a significant thrust since the beginning of this century. Now India has entered into the phase two of this policy. The second phase in India's Look East policy has a new dimension — the development of India's remote northeast. India's search for a new economic relationship with South East Asia is no longer driven by considerations of globalization, but to facilitate development of the Northeast by increasing its connectivity to the outside world. Instead of trying to isolate the Northeast from external influences, as it had done in the past, New Delhi is now recognizing the importance of opening it up for commercial linkages with South East Asia.

* Increased economic integration with Asia has helped India because the core competencies of these economies are different. So India can import the goods from other countries which can be produced by other countries at a lower cost then India. India can export those goods for which India has a competitive advantage. This arrangement is mutually beneficiation for India and East Asia countries .Due to this there is a Substantial potential of Asian Economic Integration in helping Asia resume a high growth path.

East Asia's Strengths India's Strengths

1) Electronic equipment Computer Software

2) Heavy engineering Light engineering and pharmaceuticals

3) Product development and marketing Process development

4) Underutilized capacity in construction Huge potential demand

* Look east policy has helped India in strengthening its place in the global economy and gets a better deal in its interactions outside the region. America and European countries had entered into a lot of different mutual agreement which has further increased their reputation and bargaining power. India was in danger of isolation in the global economy. India was not getting its due importance. But due to its Look east policy India economy is getting integrated with the Asian economy, so India gets support from Asian countries which have increased India's importance at global level.

Short comings in the policy

* The Look East policy did not find Japan on its radar and failed to improve India's economic ties with it. Trade with Japan actually declined dramatically dropping its share to one-third of its level of 7 per cent in 1993. One of the causes, of course, was the fact that the Japanese economy was stagnate during this period. But still it is difficult to explain the reason behind this dramatic drop. This was the biggest failure of Look east policy. Failure to involve Japan and a build economic relationship with it also resulted in closing the doors on Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI).

* India has entered into a number of pacts, agreements and FTAs but its record for implementation of such accords has been poor as can be seen from the follow up of the Indo-Thai FTA and CECA with Singapore.

The reason for poor implementation of the pacts, agreements and FTAs

* The Indian industry's doubts about its competitive efficiency.

* Indian industry does not want competition at home

* Indian industry scared of cheaper exports to India from these countries.

India should go ahead with proper implementation of the pacts, agreements and FTAs without bothering about the aforementioned factors. The Indian industry will ensure that India will always gain from these arrangements.

Suggested future framework

* The rise of China's economic potential and the resultant influence on this region should not deter India, as the region is looking for an alternative in India because of its fair practices and peace loving nature. India is preferred over China by many countries because India is democratic country. However India has to set its house in order and go ahead with its economic reforms, liberalization process and infrastructure development to gain the confidence of this region, which at present is not all that high. Economic reforms and liberalization process is being negatively affected by the left parties which is supporting the government.

* Each nation has its own characteristics – some are supportive of India, some are predominantly Muslim, some are economically more developed then India, some are underdeveloped and one is a close neighbor influencing the security of India. Hence India should tailor the bilateral relations with every country in different way to suit the requirements of that particular country and that of India.

* ASEAN and EAS hold great promise for India. Adequate interaction with these groupings will result in better integration with this region and facilitate India economic development. Indian businesses which are looking to go global will get huge markets in other countries. They will be able to export their goods and get a market share because of low tariffs due to the pacts, agreements and FTAs. Although foreign companies will also get this advantage but Indian companies will be able to compete with these because of their competitiveness.

* CMI and emerging FTAs / RTAs between Asian countries provide foundations for a broader and more ambitious initiative to take the existing India-ASEAN relationship to a higher level, like an Asian Economic Community, which constitutes ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and India as member countries. Such a community would be roughly the size of the European Union in terms of income, and bigger than NAFTA in terms of trade. It would account for half the world's population and it would hold foreign exchange reserves exceeding those of the EU and NAFTA put together. This can give a greater push to Indian growth.

DETERMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN INDIA

In a multilingual,multi cultural democratic set up like India,voting behaviour is dictated by a plethora of complex issues.From time and again it has been proved that political parties in India can not rely upon any particular factor to win the trust and confidence of the voters.Such is the complex nature of the voting behavior that even the best of the psephologists or social scientists or even genius politicians failed to read public psychology on numerous occasions.Below is a summary of the determinants of such perplexing electoral psychology.
Caste has been an important factor in Indian politics.Though recent trends show that its impact is more prominent in the state level politics,it plays a crucial role in shaping up the policy of the governments.Wooing a specific caste has been the principal agenda of many a politicians.This has been a retrogressive character of Indian politics and has so far been playing a divisive role.
Religion is another pull down factor of Indian electoral politics.Rather than uniting people,religion has mostly divided India into many watertight compartments.Fundamentalists have taken political mileage of the situation by wooing people belonging to a specific religion and infused the poison of communalism in the electoral psychology.
Regionalism has been a key determinant of Indian voting behaviour since 1990s.Demanding separate state,promoting region specific interests have been the strategies of politicians to capture the vote bank.This has bred separatism and endangered intyernal security of the country.
Language is another important factor in this regard.Although its impact is not prominet in state level politics, in the national level it has played a key role.Dividing India into Hindi and non Hindi belts is an unfortunate outcome of this.
Hero worshipping is another popular trend in India psephology.On numerous occasions political parties have tried to capture popular sentiment by using charisma of their leaders.Therefore many political parties of India today are leader based rather than being ideology based.
Ideology has been a key factor in Indian politics.Communism is a glaring example of this and though recent trends show some changes, Bengal,Tripura,Kerala have long been communist strongholds.
Some important or sudden events or incidences can change the voting behavior as well as political equations.The proclamation of emergency was one such incidence which resulted in the then Congress government being toppled by the Janata Party in 1977.
Development works in the most silent yet the most effective manner in determining the popular mandate in elections in India.Developmental slogans like"Roti,Kapda, Makan" ,"Garibi Hathao","Bijli,Sadak,Pani" have long been used to attract the attention of the people.
Apart from the above mentioned factors, race,anti incumbency factor,terrorism etc have been the other determinants.However it must be noted that many a times a number of factors work in tandem to shape up the popular electoral opinion, thus making it further difficult for the politicians to make use of the existing situation and thereby producing unpredictable results as has happened in the national level in 2004 or in several states in the recent Lok Sabha Election.

PIRACY IN SOMALIA

Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to international shipping and an issue of international concern for over a decade and a half since the beginning of civil war in Somalia.This has increased the cost of shipping and impeded the delivery of shipments.However, in the last year or so, there has been a spurt in the activities of the notorious pirates and this has posed a serious threat to the trade and commerce of many nations as the Gulf of Aden which lies on the Somali coast is one of the busiest shipping channels of the world.

The reasons behind such an alarming increase of piracy in the particular region are many.Somalia with an estimated GDP of $600 per year is one of the poorest countries of the world.Such level of poverty along with the successful hijacking of a number of ships by the pirates have drawn large number of young men toward such gangs of pirates.Clan based social structure of the country,lack of a central government because of the ongoing civil war and its strategic location all have aided in the rise of such activities.Moreover, as there has been absence of coast guards,in the earlier days a number of shipping trawlers of other countries got access into the seawater.Moreover the Somali coast has been used as a dumping ground for toxic and nuclear wastes by many European and Asian countries.This has caused an erosion of fish stock of the Somali coast.With no other options available to protect themselves from such illegal activities, the poor fishermen found hijacking both the cargo ships and passenger ships a good way to sustain themselves.As in most of the cases the ransom was paid, the local warlords found it a lucrative business and began to facilitate pirate activities thus providing a better breeding ground of piracy.The Somali diaspora has aided the pirates by providing valuable informations and funds in return of heavy monetary profit.
There has been a rare show of unity among the nations to combat piracy in that region.Various countries have deployed warships to patrol the area.Many have deployed naval forces to escort their vessels through that region.European Union has started Operation Atlanta to combat piracy in the Gulf Of Aden.India has deployed INS Tavar and INS Mysore to show her eagerness to check piracy.
However, there must be an international effort to strike at the root of the problem.United Nations must strive for restoring peace and law in the nation.Monetary organizations have to increase financial aids to Somalia. Efforts must be guided to end the civil war in the country and bring back the pirates to normal stream of life.Otherwise darker days are looming ahead.